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1. Summary 
The 2008/9 global financial crisis and now COVID-19 has demonstrated that both financial sector 
volatility and contagious diseases can cause huge worldwide economic disruptions. Threats to 
economic stability are numerous – spanning not just financial crises and public health issues but 
also ecological degradation and climate change, natural disasters, trade wars, civil unrest, 
terrorism and conflict. Future shocks could also include technological shocks (e.g. increasingly 
powerful artificial intelligence) that could increase long-term growth but cause severe disruption 
to economies in the short-term and create hardship for businesses and workers that struggle to 
adjust.  
Key findings relevant to inclusive economic resilience in middle-income countries are that: 
 Middle-income countries appear to be less economically resilient on average than high-
income countries based on a broad range of measures. This is supported by early data 
suggesting that COVID-19 has had a greater negative impact on manufacturing output in 
middle-income countries compared to high-income countries. 
The substantial economic progress achieved by middle-income countries in the past two 
decades is at risk in the wake of COVID-19. They may require additional support from 
high-income countries and IFIs in order to recover. Efforts should be made to ensure that 
gains from future growth in middle-income countries are protected by measures to 
enhance their economic resilience. 
 Middle-income counties are also less inclusive in their economic resilience than high-
income countries. This reflects the very patchy coverage of social protection schemes. 
This is particularly problematic since social protection systems serve a double function 
following economic shocks: they both serve as automatic fiscal stabilisers and help 
protect the vulnerable. 
Middle-income countries should progressively build up social protection systems. This 
needs to remain in line with increased revenue mobilisation to ensure that it can be 
sustainable. 
 Countries with poor macroeconomic fundamentals – including high levels of inflation, 
over-valued exchange rates, asset price bubbles and a weak banking sector 
characterised by high non-performing loan (NPL) rates – are more likely to be undergo a 
major crisis following a negative economic shock. 
Middle income countries can increase their economic resilience by deploying sound 
macroeconomic policies that prevent the emergence of bubbles and excess liquidity 
during economic boom periods. 
 Fiscal policy is key to mitigating the consequences of negative economic shocks. 
If middle-income countries focus maintain sound fiscal policies in normal times (including 
effective control of government expenditure), they will increase their fiscal space to 
respond effectively to future economic shocks. 
 One critical requirement to increase fiscal space is to improve on middle-income 
countries frequently weak revenue raising capacity. 
Key measures that can be taken by middle income countries include (Junquera-Varela, et 
al., 2017): (1) increasing the effectiveness of taxation of the incomes of self-employed 
professionals and the investment income of the very wealthy; (2) enhancing taxation of 
   
 
3 
natural resource production; (3) increased revenue collection from 'sin taxes' (e.g. on 
alcohol and cigarette) and 'green taxes' (e.g. fuel duty); (4) encouraging business 
formalisation in order to enhance corporation tax and VAT revenue; (5) reducing tax 
exemptions and incentive schemes; and (6) improving tax administration performance. 
 Regulations that significantly reduce labour and goods market flexibility can prolong 
recessions following negative economic shocks. 
Middle-income countries need to strike a balance between regulations designed to 
protect workers and promoting goods and labour market flexibility. 
 Controls on cross-border capital flows are frequently used by middle-income countries, 
particularly during crises. The evidence they can be an effective means of reducing 
economic volatility, without necessarily compromising economic growth. However, they 
can be challenging to implement and can have unintended consequences, for example 
by providing increased opportunities for corruption. 
Middle-income countries looking to introduce capital controls may require support in 
order to ensure that they achieve their objectives without compromising growth and 
broader development objectives. 
 Rigorous systems and procedures for crisis management can promote economic 
resilience. However, it is the effectiveness of a country's public administration system in 
general that will tend to constrain the effectiveness of crisis response. Evidence from the 
global financial crisis and from COVID-19 suggests that governments that score highly on 
standard measures of effectiveness and which have effective public administration 
systems tended to cope better. 
Middle-income countries should prioritise developing robust public administration 
systems and developing professional cadres of officials at both the policy and operational 
levels. 
 The effectiveness of government responses to a crisis appear to be strongly influenced 
by factors that can be challenging to quantify, such as political culture, social attitudes 
and the personality and priorities of key political leaders. Moreover, every shock is unique 
and exert different pressures on the economy and on government systems. An economy 
that is vulnerable to a shock that affects the tourism sector may – for example – not be 
particularly vulnerable to one focused on manufacturing, and vice versa. Similarly, a 
government with systems that enable it to respond effectively to a financial crisis, may 
struggle to cope with a pandemic or a natural disaster. 
Attempts to quantify economic resilience are likely to have limited effectiveness as 
predictive tools. Development agencies and middle-income country governments should 
not assume that resilience in the fact of previous crises or COVID-19 implies resilience to 
the next shock. Countries need to consider the different implications of a wide variety of 
potential future shocks and take steps to ensure they can be resilient to those shocks. 
 Different regions and areas of a country are frequently differentially effected by shocks. 
For example, a climate event that has little impact at the national scale may have a 
severe effect on particular communities. 
Governments in middle-income countries need to consider community-level resilience as 
well as national resilience, and to develop systems that allow them to channel support 
effectively to where it is most needed during a crisis. 
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 Prior learning from previous crises appears to give a strong advantage to countries that 
have dealt with similar shocks within the institutional memory of key institutions. 
This suggests that governments will respond more effectively to future rounds of COVID-
19 than they did early on, and that the world will likely be more prepared for future 
pandemics than they were for this one. However, it implies that we can have limited 
confidence that lessons from COVID-19 will enable governments to deal more effectively 
with future major crises of a different sort (e.g. natural disasters or technological shocks). 
 Systems that contain "slack" in normal times are less likely to buckle in the face of 
unprecedented demands following severe negative shocks. 
Development programmes should acknowledge potential trade-offs between the 
efficiency and resilience of systems. Middle-income countries should ensure that  
systems contain sufficient to cope with negative shocks. 
Three key terms are utilised in this paper, which are to some extent overlapping, and all relate to 
the threats these kinds of shocks pose: 
 "Economic vulnerability" refers to country's inherent "susceptibility to being harmed" by 
these kinds of exogenous shocks (Briguglio, 2016). Discussions of economic vulnerability 
generally focus on the likelihood of a severe negative shock occurring and on factors that 
can be considered largely outside the influence of the immediate control of government 
policy. 
 "Economic resilience" refers to "the extent to which an economy can withstand or cope 
with the negative effects" of exogenous shocks (Briguglio, 2016). Discussions of 
economic resilience tend to focus on factors that determine the depth and persistence of 
the negative consequences of a shock once it occurs, and on factors that are significantly 
influenced by government action. In practice, it is not always possible to draw a sharp a 
boundary between "economic resilience" and the "resilience" of a society more broadly; 
whilst this review focuses on the economic consequences of shocks, almost any feature 
of a system that enables a country to prevent or cope effectively with negative shocks will 
contribute to economic resilience. 
 "Inclusive economic resilience" is a term coined for the purposes of this paper at the 
request of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). It reflects the 
FCDO's emphasis on the importance of ensuring that economic resilience is achieved in 
a way that protects the interests of everyone in society. This implies that policies 
designed to promote economic resilience should take account of the specific needs of 
women, the poor, the disabled, marginalised minorities and other vulnerable groups.  
There is a very large body of literature relevant to this review, though much of it does not use the 
term economic resilience directly, which this review cannot fully do justice to. Notably, there are a 
huge number of peer-reviewed academic papers on the causes and management of negative 
economic shocks, crises and recessions. This is complemented by a wide range of discussion 
papers on the same topics by international financial institutions and a smaller body of practitioner 
papers, with the latter mainly focused on community-level economic resilience. This paper draws 
heavily on papers discussing the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008/9 and recent papers focused on the response to COVID-19. 
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This paper is divided into six sections. Section 2, explores the factors that effect a country's 
economic vulnerability, whilst Sections 3 does the same for economic resilience and Section 4 
for inclusive economic resilience specifically. Section 5 then focuses on middle-income countries 
and discusses the particular issues they frequently face that can exacerbate their economic 
vulnerability and hamper inclusive economic resilience. Finally, Section 6 focuses on three areas 
where many middle-income countries could prioritise reforms in order to improve their economic 
resilience, namely: increasing revenue mobilisation, improving their management of investment 
flows and the financial system and developing crisis management capacity. Section 6 also 
discusses the importance of ensuring that development programming in middle-income countries 
balances support for increased efficiency and robustness in order to promote both growth and 
economic resilience. 
2. What are the sources of economic shocks and what 
factors affect vulnerability to them? 
Negative economic shocks are unpredictable or hard-to-predict events that can cause 
severe disruption to the normal functioning of an economy. The likelihood of some kinds of 
shocks can be reduced by action at the local, national, regional or global scale, whilst others 
remain outside of realistic human control and all that can be done is to mitigate their 
consequences.  The evidence from recent decades suggest a wide range of threats to economic 
stability, including in middle-income countries. 
A wide range of events can cause economic shocks. Examples from recent decades 
include: 
 Financial crises, frequently linked to issues such as unsound financial sector practices 
(e.g. the Global Financial Crisis of 2008/9) 
 Currency crises, frequently linked to a combination of fixed-exchange rates and a failure 
to control inflation. Currency crises have also often shared features of financial crises, 
such as the bursting of asset price bubbles (e.g. the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997) 
 Sudden shifts in commodity prices. For example, the 1970s oil price boom negatively 
impacted on economic growth in many energy consuming advanced economies. In 
contrast, the post-2014 drop in global energy prices severely affected the economies of 
energy producing middle-income countries such as Venezuela, Russia, Algeria and 
Nigeria. 
 Public health crises such as SARS and Ebola caused specific economic disruption in 
affected areas, whilst the COVID-19 pandemic is causing huge global economic 
disruptions 
 War and civil conflict have caused huge economic hardship in many middle-income 
countries. Notably the conflict in Syria (2011-) and Yemen (2015-) have caused both to 
fall out of the rankings of middle-income countries and return to lower-income country 
status. 
 Severe climate events occasionally cause severe economic damage in affected 
countries. For example, the 2004 tsunami caused damage USD4.5 billion of damage in 
Indonesia's Aceh Province (25% of provincial annual income) (Rego, 2004). In addition, 
every year a large number of climate events occur which cause economic disruption to 
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affected countries. Individually these events tend to have a relatively small economic 
impact – around 0.05% reduction in GDP on average for a climate event affecting 1% of 
a country's population, according to a recent paper focused on developing countries 
(Simonet et al., 2017) – but cumulatively their effects are very significant. Events of this 
kind – including droughts, wildfires, floods and tropical storms – are expected to become 
more frequent and severe as a result of climate change (Van Aalst, 2006). 
There is a problem of "massive imprecision" in the assessment of the probability of rare 
events such as severe negative economic shocks (Taleb, 2010). This needs to be taken into 
account when considering issues related to economic resilience. This imprecision reflects the 
common existence of "fat-tail distributions", where events of unusual severity are less unlikely 
than might be expected based on intuition and standard risk management theories (Taleb, 2010). 
For example, even the most severe natural disasters of recent memory have been relatively 
modest compared to the potential impact that would result from calamitous events of the scale 
that we know have occurred in previous eras. Indeed, it is plausible that the next major source of 
global instability could be something as unexpected as a volcanic eruption so large that it causes 
damage to infrastructure across multiple countries (Self, 2006). 
Even once a shock occurs estimation of the likely scale of the economic consequences is 
often hugely challenging. This is borne out by the fact that in February 2020 researchers were 
estimating that the economic global cost of COVID-19 could be USD360 billion (Raga and te 
Velde, 2020), whilst less than a month later forecasts were suggesting that the cost would likely 
be in the trillions of dollars (Fernandes, 2020; McKibbin & Fernando, 2020). 
Economists use the term "economic vulnerability" to refer to a country's "susceptibility to 
being harmed" by exogenous shocks (Briguglio, 2016). Discussions of economic vulnerability 
generally  focus on the likelihood of a severe negative shock occurring and on factors that are 
largely outside the influence of the immediate control of government policy. 
Briguglio (2016) ranked 183 countries using an Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI), with 
their scores being determined by four factors: 
 Trade openness (the average of imports/GDP and exports/GDP) 
 Export concentration (the percentage of exports made up of a countries three largest 
export product groups) 
 Dependence on strategic imports (percentage of imports relating to food and fuel) 
 Proneness to natural disasters (disaster damage as a percent of GDP over the period 
1980-2011). 
The inclusion of three trade-related measures reflects the fact that countries that depend 
on trade will be more effected by economic crises originating in other countries. High 
trade as a proportion of GDP increases the impact on a national economy of global demand 
fluctuations. Moreover, if a country's exports are highly concentrated then any global demand 
shock effecting its key export lines would have a particularly severe effect. In addition, because 
demand for essential goods such as food and fuel is highly inelastic, if its imports are highly 
concentrated on these products, it will find itself particularly vulnerable to increases in global 
prices. 
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The relevance of trade-dependency to economic vulnerability appears to be borne out by 
evidence from the 2008/9 global financial crisis. Maeoka et al.'s (2012) cross-country 
regression identified high levels of trade-dependency as a key factor influencing how badly 
affected different OECD countries were by the crisis. Those countries that were highly dependent 
on "manufacturing exports such as capital goods or durable goods" and those heavily dependent 
on "strategic imports such as fuel" were found to be particularly affected. In addition, Stewart 
(2012) argues that the impact on Mexico was particularly severe because its exports were so 
highly concentrated towards the USA. 
The EVI is somewhat narrow, since it does not consider internal sources of shocks that 
are of human origin, but are outside of government control. The experience of recent 
decades is that many serious shocks have been caused by social disruption and conflict. In 
particular, issues such as prevalence of non-state armed actors in a country or the existence of 
historic ethnic or religious grievances affects not only a country's ability to respond to a shock 
(i.e. it's economic resilience), but also the probability of certain shocks occurring (e.g. large acts 
of terrorism or a civil conflict). 
Whilst risk factors can be identified, it is very challenging to assess the likelihood of 
shocks and how economically vulnerable any particular country is to them. The EVI 
provides a useful starting point for assessing  the economic vulnerability of middle-income 
countries. However, the threats to economic stability are likely more numerous and severe than 
is commonly imagined and our understanding of which countries are most economically 
vulnerable may be limited. This suggests that developing and maintaining economic resilience 
should be a priority for all countries. 
3. What is economic resilience and what factors influence 
it? 
Economic resilience has been defined as "the extent to which an economy can withstand 
or cope with the negative effects" of exogenous shocks (Briguglio, 2016). Briguglio 
describes two potential forms of economic resilience, relating to the ability of a country to: (1) 
"absorb" the effect of external economic shocks, which he associates with having the economic 
flexibility to enable a quick recovery; and (2) to counteract the harmful effects of such "shocks", 
which he associates with fiscal strength. Resilience can rest on actions taken at the national and 
local level and by both state institutions, formal non-state institutions and through informal 
collective and individual action (Rose, 2004).  Whilst Briguglio's definition is far from the only one 
in use, it provides a useful starting point and has the advantage of leaving open the question of 
what it means to "withstand or cope with" negative effects, enabling a discussion that goes 
beyond the narrowly technical to examine the broader political and social imperatives that 
influence decision making in crisis situations. 
Briguglio (2016) assessed economic resilience for 188 countries using an Economic 
Resilience Index (ERI) which takes account of: 
 Macroeconomic stability (MES), including government debt as a percentage of GDP, 
inflation and the current account balance 
   
 
8 
 Market flexibility (MFX), based on the Economic Freedom of the World Index's (EFWI) 
labour market regulations and business regulations scores and a measure of financial 
prudence (FPR). The FPR in turn is based on Global Competitiveness Index scores for 
the "soundness of banks and regulation of securities" and credit to the private sector as a 
proportion of GDP) 
 Political, social and environmental governance, measured by the political Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGIs), the non-income components of the Human Development 
Index (HDI) and the environmental performance index (EPI) 
Briguglio's ERI helped introduce a more systematic way of thinking about economic 
resilience, but it is unclear whether it successfully captures all the relevant factors. The 
predictions one would have made based on ERI scores have not aligned well with early 
assessments of COVID-19 response. Indeed, many of the countries that had been judged highly 
resilient (e.g. the USA and the UK) appeared to fare badly, whilst countries that performed 
variably on the index and had little in common – such as South Africa, Vietnam, Germany, New 
Zealand and Singapore – won praise for the effectiveness of their response (Kavanagh and 
Singh, 2020). 
Overall, whilst a range of factors that affect resilience have been identified, there is little 
indication that a set of characteristics can be defined that would enable reliable 
predictions regarding which states will prove resilient to future crises. Six months in to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, theories developed to explain why some countries initially seemed to 
respond better to the crisis than others began to appear questionable. Despite the early praise 
for Singapore's "gold standard" response (Niehus, Salazar, Taylor, & Lipsitch, 2020), it has 
struggled to contain further waves of infection and now has a case rate amongst the highest in 
the world (Woo, 2020). Similarly, despite the WHO's (2020) praise for its "incredible" early 
response, by August South Africa's handling of the crisis was being described as "troubled" and 
its lockdown was in "disarray" (Naudé and Cameron, 2020). On balance, it appears that our 
ability to predict which countries will prove economically resilient to shocks remains limited. 
Indeed, it appears that a broad range of factors affect resilience to economic shocks, that these 
factors are hard to quantify and that they are often highly context specific rather than 
generalisable to all shocks. 
Macroeconomic stability and cross-border financial flows 
The evidence on the impact of foreign investment flows on economic growth rates and the 
risk of economic crises remains contentious. Panel-data evidence has found a positive 
association between FDI inflows and growth for South Asian middle-income countries (Murari, 
2017) and for middle-income countries globally over the period 1996-2015 (Hayat, 2018). In 
contrast, evidence from Latin America indicates that the impact is mixed for upper-middle income 
countries and negative for lower-middle income countries (Alvardo et al., 2017). Cross-country 
evidence also indicates that positive effects may be contingent on broader economic freedoms in 
the recipient country (Azman-Saini et al., 2010), on having a relatively low level of natural 
resource production dependency (Hayat, 2018) and - to a lesser extent – on institutional quality 
(Hayat, 2019). However, FDI flow volatility also appears to be negatively associated with growth 
(Lensink and Morrissey, 2006). 
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Large inflows of foreign portfolio investment may increase the risks of economic shocks, 
particularly in countries with relatively under-developed financial systems. Foreign portfolio 
investment can be more easily and rapidly reversed than foreign direct investment (Durham, 
2004), potentially creating cascades of failure if global markets lose confidence in an economy. 
The relationships between FDI and foreign portfolio investment and economic volatility was 
extensively analysed in the wake of the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, with asset price 
bubbles associated with rapid foreign portfolio investment flows into East Asian countries 
frequently blamed for precipitating the crisis (Fernandez-Arias, et al., 2001). 
Financial sector regulation 
The lessons of recent crises have led to a much greater focus on the importance of 
effective financial sector regulation in promoting economic resilience. Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2011), and many others, have argued that rapid growth of credit and weak regulation 
led to a weakening of banking sectors around the world culminating in the global financial crisis 
of 2008/9. As Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (1999) note, financial sector reforms may increase 
efficiency but they can also increase the vulnerability to financial crises by "allowing banks to 
hold more risky assets than would be the case in a regulated system, by exposing banks to 
greater competition, or by exposing them to a greater degree of market risk, such as interest-rate 
or exchange-rate risk."  Weller (2001) argue that emerging economies have tended to become 
more vulnerable to banking crises following financial sector liberalisation, including the removal 
of credit ceilings, reduction in lending requirements and removal of market entry restrictions. 
These risks are arguably stronger in countries which go into liberalisation with relatively under-
developed financial sectors and in systems where there are strong implicit guarantees that could 
encourage risky practices (Tornell and Westermann, 2002). 
Fiscal space 
The severity of negative economic shocks can frequently be reduced by using increased 
government expenditure to maintain economic activity and protect vulnerable businesses 
and individuals. Haider (2020) describes policy measures that can lessen the negative 
economic consequences of an epidemic or financial crisis, including fiscal stimulus packages, job 
retention schemes and credit guarantee schemes for effected businesses. Similarly, Capano et 
al.'s (2020) list of the most common policy responses to COVID-19 reveals that social distancing 
measures was only ranked number five. The top four were all fiscal measures, namely: (1) tax 
payment deferrals; (2) targeted tax cuts and exemptions; (3) relaxation of eligibility rules for 
unemployment insurance and introduction of compensation for loss of income due to reduced 
working hours; and (4) relaxation of loan conditions and interest rate cuts. 
Countries which can raise revenue effectively and can borrow from financial markets 
easily and cheaply are better able to finance the expenditure needed to respond to 
economic shocks (Haider, 2020). Building fiscal space have long been considered key to state-
building and inclusive development (Junquera-Valera et al., 2017), but its relevance to economic 
resilience is equally clear. Countries with strong credit ratings are able to secure cheap financing 
internationally, whilst those that have poor credit ratings may find the cost of borrowing 
prohibitive. Countries can improve their credit ratings by lowering levels of debt, keeping inflation 
stable and relatively low, maintaining foreign exchange reserves, keeping current account deficits 
under control and building a track record for meeting debt obligations. Even where countries are 
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looking to finance expenditure by borrowing it is vital that they can demonstrate the ability to 
raise revenue via taxation and to control public expenditure. If they cannot demonstrate the 
ability to do this, they will lack credibility with markets, increasing their costs of borrowing.  
The COVID experience demonstrates the relevance of fiscal space to economic resilience. 
Large and wealthy countries with good access to credit markets have rapidly increased 
borrowing in order to finance programmes that lesson the blow on those whose jobs or business 
were affected by the crisis. Amongst smaller states, Woo (2020) notes that the "operational and 
analytical capacities" that bolstered Singapore’s efforts to manage COVID-19 pandemic 
depended heavily on fiscal capacity, whilst its USD370 billion of pre-crisis reserves enabled it to 
cushion the economic blow of the crisis on citizens and businesses. 
Market flexibility. 
Economies are better able to recover from a shock if prices and wages are able to adjust 
through market processes. Duval et al. (2007) used OECD data to conduct a cross-country 
regression evidence and found that strict employment protection legislation delays recovery from 
shocks, whilst strict product market regulations may initially dampen the impact of a shock but 
also ends up delaying recovery. The authors estimate that for the average OECD country a two 
standard deviation decline in EPL stringency would reduce the half-life of output gaps by half a 
year, whilst a two standard deviation increase in PMR would decrease the initial depth of a shock 
by half.  
Government effectiveness. 
Evidence from COVID-19 confirms that governments that score highly on standard 
measures of effectiveness and which have effect public administration systems tend to 
cope better with major crises. Regression analysis suggests a negative association between 
measures of government effectiveness and COVID-19 case mortality rates (Liang et al., 2020). 
Woo (2020) describes how Singapore's strong policy development and disaster response 
capacity supported its early successes in containing COVID-19. Similarly, Janssen and der 
Voort's (2020) case study of the Dutch response to COVID-19, concludes that "bureaucracies 
are vital" in crisis response, enabling "agility and adaptability" by supporting rapid implementation 
of new policies and systems and compliance with new measures. 
Major crises require the rapid mobilisation, coordination and deployment of national 
resources. Wein and Rose (2011) utilise data from simulations of the consequences of 
earthquakes to argue for the importance of minimising business interruption by "speeding 
recovery through repair and reconstruction." This kind of "dynamic resilience" has parallels with 
the response to COVID-19, which has frequently required rapid and concerted action, with 
planning and delivery processes sped up far beyond the levels that would be possible in normal 
times. Here the financial, project management and engineering resources mobilised by China to 
construct two specialist COVID hospital in Wuhan in February 2020 (NPR, 2020) stands out. 
Whilst some have suggested that COVID-19 demonstrates that authoritarian governments 
have an advantage when it comes to responding to major crises, it remains unclear 
whether this is really the case. Potential advantages include the ability of authoritarian regimes 
to act decisively in the national  without needing to worry about external scrutiny or electoral 
consequences. Numerous commentators have discussed China's success in enforcing the very 
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strict lockdown in Wuhan that helped contain the disease there with relatively little loss of life, as 
well as early successes in Singapore and the apparent success in Turkey. However, many 
commentators have pointed to the early failure in China, where the government's instinct to 
"suppress information" meant that COVID was not brought under control early enough to prevent 
it spreading globally (Alon, et al., 2020). In addition, Frey et al. (2020) provide regression 
evidence showing that autocratic states implemented stricter measures to reduce mobility than 
democratic states, but that their measures were less effective. In contrast, Petersen (2020) 
analysed testing rates as a proxy for effectiveness of response, finding that both very democratic 
and very autocratic states performing variably but relatively well on average, whilst anocracies 
(intermediate regimes between democracies and autocracies) performed poorly across the 
board. 
Other factors 
There is evidence that economic resilience is not a general characteristic of a country, but 
rather is always relative to the specific shock perturbing a system – as a consequence it 
is very difficult to make general predictions about which countries will prove resilient to 
future shocks. Sensier et al. (2016) note that there was little correlation between those 
European regions that proved resilient to the economic shocks of the early 1990s and those that 
proved resilient to the global financial crisis of 2008/2009. Maeoka et al. (2012) argued from data 
from the 2008 financial crisis that fuel exporting countries are more resilient. However, in 2014 a 
massive global decline in energy prices meant that energy exporters such as Algeria, Russia and 
Venezuela suffered severe economic and social disturbances whilst energy-importing countries 
continued to grow. Similarly, Stewart (2012) notes that the reliance of many poor Philippine 
households on remittances from relatives abroad was a source of vulnerability during the global 
financial crisis, whilst Makhlouf et al. (2020) identifies the continued flow of remittance payments 
as underpinning the surprising resilience of many poor families in conflict-affected Syria. 
This has led to the development of indices that attempt to assess economic resilience in 
the face of specific threats. For example, when Raga and te Velde (2020) assessed different 
countries' economic resilience in February 2020, they (like Briguglio) included measures related 
to fiscal space, but left out the measures focused on market flexibility and switched from generic 
governance indicators to two measures focused specifically on the health sector: health 
expenditure as a share of GDP and the Healthcare Access and Quality Index (GBD 2015 
Healthcare Access and Quality Collaborators, 2017). This reflected a recognition that economic 
resilience in the face of COVID would be highly dependent on the quality of each country's health 
system. Assessing economic resilience to different kinds of shock (e.g. AI-related service sector 
automation) might require assessment of quite different factors. 
However, even relatively tailored assessments often appear to have limited predictive 
validity. Kavanagh and Singh (2020) note that specific indices developed to assess countries' 
capacity to prevent and mitigate epidemics, such as the Global Health Security (GHS) Index, 
have proved to be poor predictors of the effectiveness of responses to the COVID pandemic. 
Even Raga and te Velde's (2020) February 2020 assessments of vulnerability and likely 
economic resilience in the face of coronavirus have had limited predictive success. For example, 
, Mongolia was assessed as highly vulnerable both due to its direct links to China (then the 
epicentre of the epidemic) and due to it being a relatively open economy, and was assessed as 
low on resilience based on its macroeconomic fundamentals and performance on the Health 
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Quality Index. In contrast, Mexico was judged to be highly low on vulnerability based on direct 
links to China, relatively low on vulnerability based on trade openness and much more 
economically resilient than Mongolia. Yet Mongolia's monthly manufacturing output dropped 
year-on-year by an average of 9% over the period February to June, whilst Mexico's dropped by 
an average of 20%. In addition, as of September almost 74,000 people have died from the 
disease in Mexico, with over 700,000 cases recorded, whilst Mongolia appears to have avoided 
community transmission entirely to date and has no recorded deaths. 
Past experience with similar crises appears to be critical in managing and preserving 
economic resilience during a crisis. It is notable that many of the states judged to have 
responded most effectively to COVID-19 in the early months of 2020 were those that had been 
most effected by the SARS outbreak (in descending order of number of SARS cases): China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Canada, Singapore and Vietnam (WHO, 2003). It is also noticeable that 
Singapore's performance was strong in areas for which SARS had prepared it (e.g. case 
identification and contact tracing), but dropped sharply once it came to dealing with an issue for 
which SARS provided no blueprint, namely managing the spread of the disease amongst migrant 
workers living in densely-populated housing (Woo, 2020). This is not the first time that "prior 
experience and political learning" has proven relevant. For example, the relatively strong 
performance of East Asian countries in handling the 2008/9 global financial crisis, appears to be 
partly related to their prior experience during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (Athukorala, 
2010), in which their performance was much more haphazard. 
Even less tangibly, the personalities of individual leaders and the political pressures they 
face appears to play a major role in the effectiveness of national responses to crises. 
Kavanagh and Singh (2020) note that early "tentative successes" amongst COVID-19 responses 
rested on "leadership that took the threat seriously, listened to experts, and was able to quickly 
and effectively implement policies." These kinds of factors are not likely to be permanent features 
of any system and cannot be altered by the kinds of programmes donors might conduct in 
middle-income countries. 
Government systems that are built in normal times and optimised for static efficiency are 
unlikely to prove resilient to severe shocks – robustness requires "excess capacity". 
Resilience requires "organisational slack" of the kind that the Singaporean health system 
developed in the aftermath of SARS by building the National Centre for Infectious Diseases 
Hospital (Woo, 2020). The hospital was created specifically to be used in case of a SARS-like 
epidemic and in normal times was largely left to focus on research activities. However, when 
COVID-19 began it enabled a rapid and effective response. The counterpoint to this is the way in 
which a shift to efficient "just-in-time" inventory systems and the dismissal of medical stockpiles 
as "an unnecessary expense" led to shortages of personal protective equipment in many 
countries early in the COVID-19 response (Feinmann, 2020). The importance of organisational 
slack is not confined to health sector – different kinds of shock could put unprecedented strains 
on other parts of government such as the fire service, police, military or even the education 
system. It also applies to non-sectoral systems: a highly lean civil service may not be able to 
respond to the new demands of a crisis as effectively as one which  in normal times contains an 
element of redundancy. 
The resilience of different countries in the face of superficially similar shocks often relate to hard-
to-quantify historical, social and cultural factors. The trajectories of Tunisia and Libya since 2011 
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is illustrative. Both countries went through a revolution against a dictator at roughly the same 
time, but whilst Tunisia preserved sufficient national consensus and unity to conduct a relatively 
successful democratic transition and preserve some level of economic stability (Ouhibi, 2019), 
Libya descended into a protracted civil conflict which has led to the implosion of its economy. 
The factors underpinning these different trajectories are varied, but the much greater importance 
of tribal and regional identities in Libya compared to Tunisia appears relevant (Henneburg, 
2019), as does the greater prominence of norms related to social justice, compromise and unity 
in Tunisian political and social dialogue (Mahmoud & Súilleabháin, 2020).  
The relevance of social and cultural factors to resilience in the face of shocks has also 
been partly borne out in relation to the COVID-19 crisis. Inter-country differences in public 
attitudes and acceptance of similar COVID-related restrictions has been widely noted, with high 
levels of public compliance appearing to play a role in early successes in bringing the disease 
under conrol in some countries. This has been quantified by Frey et al. (2020), who found greater 
compliance with rules to reduce geographic mobility in countries with more collectivist cultures 
compared to those that were more individualistic. 
All this indicates that economic resilience may be highly unpredictable, with the 
effectiveness of national responses to a crisis – and therefore of economic resilience –heavily 
dependent on the personalities of those in key leadership positions, on sector-specific capacity, 
and on the existence of a cadre of officials that have learnt from their experience in similar crises 
in the past. This suggests that the response to future COVID-like epidemics will be much better 
than those of early 2020. However, it also implies that those countries that responded most 
effectively to COVID may not be those that respond best to a future natural disaster, 
unprecedented refugee flows or a Chernobyl-like nuclear catastrophe. 
4. What is inclusive economic resilience and what factors 
influence it? 
By extension to Briguglio's (2016) definition, inclusive economic resilience can be 
understood as the ability of a country to withstand or cope with the negative effect of 
exogenous shocks, whilst protecting the interests of all its citizens. The term has been 
coined specifically for this paper, with the intention of reflecting the FCDO's emphasis on 
protecting vulnerable groups and individuals as a core component of fostering economic 
resilience. Inclusion is important to the debate around economic resilience because features of a 
system that create resilience for some actors may not benefit others or could even increase their 
vulnerability. Inclusive economic resilience requires that the state is willing and able to channel 
resources and support to the people and communities where it is needed most. 
It is important to note that there are potential tensions between inclusivity and economic 
resilience. Martin (2012) illustrates the potential for disparate interests of different groups when 
it comes to responding to an economic shock. He discusses how the resilience of firms may be 
increased if they have the ability to take measures that "cut costs and increase productivity" this 
might increase the vulnerability of workers facing reductions in working hours, wage decreases 
or loss of benefits. A key aspect of economic resilience is the ability of an economy to adjust and 
adapt in the face of a shock. In practice, this can involve job losses and bankruptcies, which can 
cause severe hardship for vulnerable individuals and communities. Whilst regulations or 
programmes that protect against these issues can help to stave of the symptoms of a crisis in the 
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short-term in some circumstances they may prevent or delay adjustments that would support a 
sustainable recovery. 
However, a lack of inclusion can also undermine economic resilience. This has been borne 
out by the example of Singapore during the COVID-19 crisis. Singapore won widespread praise 
for its handling of the epidemic, but its relative neglect of the plight of poor migrant workers 
meant that it struggled to control subsequent waves of infections, which spread rapidly in 
crowded migrant worker accommodation (Woo, 2020). This has undoubtedly exacerbated the 
economic disruption caused by the pandemic. 
Inclusive economic resilience can be understood along two dimensions: vertical and 
horizontal inclusivity. The vertical inclusivity of economic resilience relates to the extent 
to which the interests of the most vulnerable individuals in society are protected following 
an economic shock. Vertical inclusivity would encompass disparities in the effects of shocks 
and responses to shocks on groups such as: 
 The very poor 
 The disabled and sick 
 The aged 
 Children 
 Marginalised ethnic, tribal or religious minority groups 
 Migrants, refugees and the internally displaced 
 Women and girls 
 Sexual minorities 
COVID-19 has demonstrated the challenges of ensuring that the interests of vulnerable 
groups are protected following major shocks. Notably, in many countries young people and 
those in insecure forms of employment (e.g. zero-hours contracts) have been disproportionately 
affected by job losses and reduced economic activity. In Singapore failures to build inclusion into 
the country's pandemic response led to suffering for one particularly vulnerable group, migrant 
workers, who were both more affected by the disease and frequently faced sudden deportation 
as a result of job loss (The Straits Times, 2020). 
The horizontal dimension to the inclusivity of economic resilience, relates to spatial 
disparities in the impact of shocks (Martin, 2012). Different regions and areas of a country 
may be differentially affected by economic shocks, so that a relatively small shock in national 
terms may have a severe effect on particular communities. Notably the effects of natural 
disasters and climate events, as well as civil unrest and conflict, are often geographically 
concentrated. However, even more classic economic shocks often have an uneven effect based 
on the economic specialisations of different areas. In the UK, the disproportionate negative 
impact of the recession of the early 1980s on industrial areas of the North of England exemplifies 
this issue. Such issues can relate both to differential vulnerability of different regions, and 
differences in the support provided to different areas following shocks based on factors such as 
the importance of different areas to ruling elites.  
Wealthier countries are generally more able to ensure that inclusion is built into economic 
resilience following crises, though it does not mean that they always do so. Countries with 
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higher GDP per capita tend to be more economically resilient in general based on Briguglio's 
(2016) ERI, though they are not inherently so (Sensier et al., 2016). Wealthier countries also tend 
to have a lower proportion of the population that is highly vulnerable due to poverty and are able 
to channel more resources to support those who are vulnerable during a downturn. 
The existence of adequate social protection schemes is vital to protecting the interests of 
vulnerable individuals in the aftermath of an economic shock. Workers subjected to job 
losses and reduced hours, as well as the self-employed whose work dries up, face sudden, acute 
reductions in their income. Where unemployment benefits, income support and other 
mechanisms already exist, this issue is mitigated. The practical significance of this is discussed 
by Stewart (2012), who finds that the existence of social protection schemes in the Southern 
European, Eastern European and Latin American countries most effected by the 2008/9 global 
financial crisis was a factor explaining why the impact on poverty of that crisis was less severe 
than that of the 1980s debt crisis, despite the much greater falls in domestic domestic product in 
2008/9. Such schemes are normally complex and time-consuming to set-up, so they normally 
need to be in place prior to a crisis. It is frequently easier to scale up such scheme than to create 
them from scratch, so having a social protection system in place (even if set at a relatively 
modest level) can give governments options when it comes to responding quickly and effectively 
to a crisis.  
Whilst it is included in this section on the inclusivity economic resilience, social 
protection schemes are a potentially important tool in promoting economic resilience in 
general. Social protection schemes may serve as automatic stabilisers that mitigate the 
aggregate economic consequences of a crisis without the delays that tend to occur when 
designing tailored fiscal responses (Quak, 2020). However, the empirical evidence suggests that 
the generosity of such schemes (e.g. unemployment benefit replacement rates) has little impact 
on either the persistence or depth of shocks. 
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5. How economically vulnerable and resilient are MICs 
currently and why? 
Based on Briguglio's (2016) ERI and EVI, 38 out of 109 middle-income countries are 
identified as of low economic resilience, including 22 which were also identified as being 
of highly economically vulnerable (see  
 
See: Table 1, below). 11 out of 56 upper-middle income countries are identified as of low 
resilience, with six of those also identified as highly vulnerable. 27 out of 53 lower-middle income 
countries were identified as low resilience, with 16 of these also identified as highly vulnerable. 
 
See: Table 1: Middle-income countries classed as low economic resilience. Source: Briguglio (2016, 
p.1069), https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JES-12-2014-
0203/full/pdf?casa_token=hMqRR1orHM0AAAAA:wp2UaCem_9TtRhwNC9Zq8ZFS-
jpIYNHf3c5XCv9xDi8Cg6c0MoWjE8ZCzbBL1AAxEeO5xbmpErE9Q2hNEXeIEenhHVbLLbNbubUtOfmBXwZirW
VTmIo  
 
Early data on the economic impact of COVID-19 supports this picture of high economic 
vulnerability and/or low economic resilience amongst many middle-income countries, 
notably in comparison to high-income countries. In the absence of comprehensive within-
year GDP estimates, one imperfect but informative measure of the impact of COVID-19 is to 
compare UNIDO's monthly total manufacturing output figures for 2020 to the same months in 
2019. Data for the 36 middle-income countries with at least three months of 2020 data currently 
available is presented in for the period January-July (Table 2, below). For most of these countries 
– with the notable exception of China, where the impact of the pandemic on manufacturing 
peaked much earlier – the most affected month was April 2020. For the 35 middle-income 
countries with available data the average year-on-year decline in manufacturing output in April 
was 28%. This compares to just 19% for the 34 high-income countries with available data. 
Whilst almost all middle-income countries have been negatively affected by COVID-19, the 
early evidence suggests substantial variation in the severity of the economic impact that 
does not align well with predictions based on Brigugulio's (2016) EVI and ERI. Figure 1, 
below, plots the results for the five most and five least-affected middle-income countries in April 
2020. In that month production declined by an average of 5% year-on-year in the five least-
affected countries, but by an average of 63% in the five most-affected countries. None of the five 
worst-affected states based on this measure were assessed as having low economic resilience 
based on Briguglio's ERI. In contrast, amongst the least-affected, Senegal was assessed has low 
in economic resilience based on the ERI, whilst Côte d'Ivoire and the Ukraine were assessed as 
being of both high vulnerability and low resilience. 
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Figure 1: impact of COVID-19 on manufacturing in 10 middle-income countries.  
 
Source: UNIDO (https://stat.unido.org/database), reproduced with permission 
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Table 2: year-on-year change in total monthly manufacturing output for January-July 2020 in 37 middle-income 
countries.  
 
2020 
M01 
2020 
M02 
2020 
M03 
2020 
M04 
2020 
M05 
2020 
M06 
2020 
M07 
Jordan 0% 0% -23% -92% -12% -7% N/A. 
India 2% 4% -22% -66% -39% -16% -11% 
Tunisia 7% 2% -21% -53% -27% N/A. N/A. 
Peru -4% -5% -38% -53% -33% N/A. N/A. 
Philippines 1% 3% -5% -50% -41% -30% N/A. 
South Africa -2% -3% -5% -48% -32% -18% -12% 
Sri Lanka 1% 2% -28% -45% -27% -18% -6% 
Honduras 5% 5% -30% -44% -49% -26% N/A. 
North 
Macedonia 
3% 4% -12% -39% -32% -15% -8% 
Pakistan -5% -2% -14% -39% -26% -13% N/A. 
Malaysia 2% 7% -3% -38% -23% 5% 2% 
Mexico -1% -3% -6% -36% -36% -18% -10% 
Colombia 3% 2% -8% -35% -24% -11% -9% 
Turkey 7% 9% -1% -33% -20% 1% 4% 
Argentina 0% 0% -17% -32% -24% -9% -7% 
Brazil 2% 0% -9% -31% -21% -12% -3% 
Moldova 8% 7% 0% -28% -14% -9% N/A. 
Bangladesh 7% 7% 6% -25% N/A. N/A. N/A. 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-4% -5% -16% -24% -18% -9% -9% 
Nicaragua 7% 16% -3% -22% N/A. N/A. N/A. 
Ecuador 4% 2% 2% -21% -8% 33% N/A. 
Serbia 7% 2% 2% -19% -9% 2% -1% 
Bulgaria 2% -1% -7% -18% -16% -9% -6% 
Thailand -5% -5% -12% -16% -21% -18% N/A. 
Egypt N/A. 1% -11% -15% -12% N/A. N/A. 
Viet Nam 7% 7% 7% -15% -8% 2% 1% 
Mongolia -16% 12% -25% -14% -16% 1% N/A. 
Russia 4% 2% 3% -10% -6% -7% -3% 
Belarus -4% 1% -3% -8% -2% -1% N/A. 
Costa Rica 3% 10% 7% -7% -10% -8% -3% 
Ukraine -3% -3% -4% -7% -8% -9% N/A. 
Côte d'Ivoire 5% 5% -1% -5% N/A. N/A. N/A. 
Senegal -3% -6% 5% -3% -6% -2% N/A. 
China -21% -16% -6% 0% 3% 4% 7% 
Kazakhstan 20% 22% 16% 9% 8% 16% N/A. 
Guatemala 6% 5% -8% N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. 
Source: UNIDO (https://stat.unido.org/database), reproduced with permission 
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An alternative indicator of indicator of low economic resilience is state-fragility. The 
Fragile States Index (The Fund for Peace, 2020) attempts to capture factors that undermine the 
functioning of a state. This includes attempted measures of some of the harder to quantify factors 
that (as per the previous discussion) may underpin whether a country can respond effectively to 
a crisis. The index takes into account: (1) lack of control over security apparatus; (2) factionalised 
elites; (3) group grievances; (4) economic strength; (5) economic inequality; (6) human flight and 
brain drain; (7) state legitimacy; (8) quality of public services; (9) respect for human rights; (10) 
demographic pressures; (11) refugees and internally displaced persons; and (12) external 
interventions. 
Some middle-income states are beset by problems of high fragility, which is likely to 
severely reduce their economic resilience.  Figure 2, below, shows a scatter plot for lower-
income and middle-income countries comparing GDP per capita to a modified measure of the 
state fragility index (including all measures except economic strength). As can be seen, whilst 
there is a correlation between GDP per capita and state fragility, several lower-middle income 
countries score very poorly. These include (from most fragile downwards): (1) Cameroon; (2) 
Zimbabwe; (3) Iraq; (4) Nigeria; (5) Myanmar; (6) Libya (upper-middle income); (7) Pakistan; (8) 
the Republic of Congo; (9) Kenya; and (10) Côte d'Ivoire. 
Figure 2: Fragility in middle-income countries.  
 
Source: Author’s own, data taken from Fragile States Index (The Fund for Peace, 2020), 
https://fragilestatesindex.org/  
In addition, a substantial minority of middle-income countries are anocracies, which are 
known to be plagued by instability and low levels of effectiveness potentially also 
reducing their economic resilience. Anocracies are intermediate states between autocracies 
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and full democracies. 28 out of 88 middle-income states classified according to their regime type 
by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013, 2018) were found to be anocracies. Anocracies have been 
found to be of particularly high risk of political and economic instability. Petersen (2020) also 
found that anocracies were the least likely regime type to perform well in terms of COVID testing 
rates. 
A substantial minority of middle-income countries face serious risks of climate-related 
shocks. GermanWatch (Eckstein et al., 2020) has developed a climate risk index using data 
from weather-related disasters over the period 1999-2018, which takes into account: (1) number 
of deaths; (2) number of deaths per 100,000 population; (3) losses in PPP USD; and (4) losses 
as a proportion of GDP. Analysis was conducted as part of the research for this paper, utilising a 
modified version of this dataset (using just losses as a share of GDP and deaths per 100,000 
population, in order to create an index that can be used to compare the vulnerability of countries 
regardless of size and population), to compare climate risk (with smaller numbers indicating more 
risk) to GDP per capita. As can be seen, from Figure 3, below, for lower and middle-income 
countries, there is no clear relationship between GDP per capita and this measure of climate risk 
though a simple regression analysis covering 178 countries revealed a statistically significant 
association between GDP per capita and reduced climate risk. However, this only explains 3% of 
variation in risk. Indeed, some of the highest risk countries on this measure are in fact upper-
middle income countries, such as Dominica, Grenada, Fiji and Belize. 
Small, island states – many of which are middle-income countries – appear particularly 
vulnerable to climate risks. Out of the top fifteen most vulnerable countries based on this 
measure only two are not island states: lower middle-income Myanmar (fifth most vulnerable) 
and upper-middle income Belize (tenth most vulnerable). This fits with analysis suggesting that 
Caribbean island states can expect a natural disaster every few years that results in damage and 
losses in excess of 5% of GDP (Bustillo and Velloso, 2018).  
Figure 3: risk of climate-related shocks and GDP per capita.  
 
Source: Author’s own, data taken from Climate Risk Index (Ecksein et al., 2020) 
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Middle-income countries perform variably based on measures of macroeconomic 
stability, with a minority showing signs of serious weaknesses prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic and a high proportion having poor credit ratings. In 2018 at least 27 middle-
income countries had reserves equivalent to three months or less of imports, including Myanmar, 
several small island Caribbean states and Belarus. Fourteen had external debts greater than 
90% of GDP. A number appear particularly vulnerable based on these measures, including 
Mongolia with external debts equivalent to 254% of GDP and reserves equivalent to just four 
months of imports and Djibouti with external debts equal to 158% of GDP and one month of 
imports worth of reserves. Of the 53 middle-income countries rated by Moody's for sovereign risk 
in 2020 only thirteen scored at lower-medium grade or above (see Table 3: Table 3, below). This 
demonstrates the challenges faced by middle-income countries securing financing from 
international markets, which potentially limit their ability to counteract shocks using fiscal policy. 
Table 3: sovereign risk ratings for middle-income countries.  
Grade Lower-middle income Upper-middle income 
Source: Author’s own, data taken from https://countryeconomy.com/ratings 
Upper-
medium 
grade 
N/A. Malaysia 
China 
Botswana 
Peru 
Lower-
medium 
grade 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
India 
Mauritius 
Kazakhstan 
Mexico 
Bulgaria 
Thailand 
Colombia 
Non-
investment 
grade 
speculative 
Morocco 
Bangladesh 
Senegal 
Brazil 
Dominican Republic 
South Africa 
Fiji 
Paraguay 
Namibia 
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Guatemala 
Armenia 
Highly 
speculative 
Bolivia 
Tunisia 
Angola 
Ukraine 
Papua New Guinea 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Cambodia 
Pakistan 
Costa Rica 
Turkey 
Montenegro 
Belarus 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Jamaica 
Albania 
Jordan 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Sri Lanka 
El Salvador 
Substantial 
risks 
N/A. Belize 
Surinam 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
Extremely 
speculative 
N/A. Lebanon 
Argentina 
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Other measures indicate severe fiscal constraints in a substantial number of middle-
income countries. In at least 30 middle-income countries government revenue represents 15% 
or less of GDP, in at least 22 there were more than 70 children or old people per 100 working 
age adults, whilst in 31 less than 50% of the total population were in employment. This indicates 
both that revenue collection capacity is weak and that many may have a relatively small taxable 
base relative to demands on expenditure. This could make it harder for these governments to 
take decisive action following shocks.  
There is evidence that maintaining sound macroeconomic fundamentals is particularly 
important for small middle-income countries. These countries are particularly likely to default 
in the wake of structural shocks and that their cost of borrowing tends to be high relative to larger 
countries. For example, in the wake of the global financial crisis smaller Caribbean states were 
particularly likely to restructure bond payments, causing sovereign debt spreads for Caribbean 
states to increase significantly and their sovereign debt rating to decreasing significantly relative 
to the larger Latin American states (Bustillo and Velloso, 2014). Whilst this is partly an indication 
of their economic vulnerability, it also reduces their economic resilience by limiting their options 
for using fiscal policy for stabilisation and to protect the vulnerable. 
Average bank capital-asset ratios were unexceptional in most middle-income countries in 
the run-up to COVID-19. However, these is likely to have changed this year as the risk-
weightings of assets will have deteriorated sharply. In all middle-income countries except 
Equatorial Guinea the average Tier 1 capital-asset ratio was above the 6% minimum specified 
under Basel III in 20018 (see Figure 4, below) though this does not imply that this is the case for 
all banks within each country. Indeed, the average regulatory Tier-1 capital-asset ratio for middle-
income countries was only slightly below that for high-income countries (16% rather than 17%). 
However, there was fairly substantial variation amongst middle-income countries, with a number 
(e.g. Bangladesh, Lebanon, Honduras, Vietnam, Russia, Cameroon, Bolivia and Myanmar) 
having a Tier 1 capital-asset ratio in the 7-11% range which characterised those countries most 
badly affected by the global financial crisis in the run up to 2008/9 (Navajas and Thegeya, 2013). 
Figure 4: average bank Tier 1 regulatory-capital to risk-weighted assets in middle-income countries. Source: IMF 
(https://data.imf.org/), reproduced with permission 
 
   
 
23 
Non-performing loan ratios (NPLs) were moderate in most middle-income countries prior 
to COVID-19, but worryingly high in a small minority – the situation is likely to have 
deteriorated this year, increasing the risks of banking crises going forward. Figure 5 plots 
the most recently available IMF data on NPLs (all pre-COVID) against GDP per capita for 68 
middle-income countries. The median rate is just 5%, slightly more than the median of 2% for 
higher-income countries, and it appears that lower-middle income countries are more likely than 
higher-middle income countries to have a high NPL. However, 20% of the sample (13 countries) 
have a NPL ratio over 10%, compared to just 10% for the higher-income countries. Furthermore, 
those middle-income countries with higher NPL ratios also tend to have weaker Tier 1 capital-
asset ratios. This indicates that there are a minority of middle-income countries were likely 
already fairly vulnerable to banking crises prior to COVID-19. Many businesses and individuals 
are likely defaulting on loan payments in the wake of COVID-19 or will do so in the near future. 
This implies that – beyond the COVID-19 pandemic itself – there will be a heightened risk of 
financial sector shocks in middle-income countries in the next few years. 
Figure 5: Non-performing loan ratios (%) compared to GDP per capita in middle-income countries. 
Source: World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/), licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
License (CC BY 4.0), 
 
A high proportion of middle-income countries are relatively open economies with high 
levels of trade dependency, which increases their susceptibility to financial shocks. In 
2018, out middle-income countries with available data, 68 had a trade to GDP ratio above the 
global average of 59%, compared to just 35 below the average. Moreover, 38 middle-income 
countries had a trade to GDP ratio above 90%. In addition, World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS) (World Bank, 2020) data reveals that those middle-income countries for which data is 
available had a substantially higher export concentration than do high income countries. 
Together this suggests a pattern of middle-income country vulnerability to international demand 
shocks. 
Data from the ILO (2017) indicates very patchy coverage of social protection schemes in 
many middle-income countries, reducing their ability to rely on automatic fiscal stabilisers 
during crisis and increasing the likely negative impact of shocks on vulnerable groups. In 
many African middle-income countries (e.g. Ghana; Kenya; Lesotho; Nigeria) unemployment 
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social protection coverage is entirely missing, whilst in other parts of the world coverage is often 
low even in upper-middle income countries (e.g. less than 8% in Brazil). In general, old age 
protection coverage is better than unemployment protection (e.g. in Africa: 16% in Ghana; 25% 
in Kenya; and 94% in Lesotho), but it remains variable even comparing countries from the same 
region and similar GDP per capita (e.g. 52% in Ecuador but just 22% in Paraguay). Coverage for 
the severely disabled appears even more varied, with universal coverage in some middle-income 
countries (e.g. Brazil), but minimal coverage in many other (e.g. 2% in Bolivia). 
Labour market regulations vary widely across middle-income countries, with low levels of 
flexibility in some potentially limiting their ability to adjust appropriately in the face of 
economic shocks. The Heritage Foundation assesses labour market freedom as part of its 
Economic Freedom of the World Index. As can be seen from Figure 6, below, middle-income 
countries vary widely based on this 0-100 scale, with no clear relationship between relative 
wealth and labour market flexibility. A similar pattern of wide variation in performance, largely 
uncorrelated with GDP per capita, can be found for the Ease of Doing Business Index (which I 
take as a proxy for  well-managed and flexible business environment). 
Figure 6: labour market flexibility compared to GDP per capita in middle-income countries. Source: World Bank 
(www.doingbusiness.org), licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), 
 
6. What kinds of policies and systems would support 
inclusive economic resilience in MICs? 
This section examines three policy areas in which reforms could potentially increase the 
economic resilience of middle-income countries. 
Revenue mobilisation 
Increasing fiscal space in middle-income countries will need to rest on two main planks: 
increased revenue mobilisation and expenditure prioritisation and control. On the revenue 
side, the relatively poor performance of middle-income countries is clear: high-income countries 
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have a tax-GDP ratio slightly below 40% on average, for upper-middle income countries it is not 
much more than 30% and lower-middle income countries tend to have a ratio of only around 25% 
(Junquera-Valera et al., 2017). 
The World Bank (Junquera-Varela, et al., 2017) has set out a number of priorities for 
revenue reform in middle-income countries, including: 
 Increasing revenue from direct taxation, especially by increasing the effectiveness of 
taxation of the incomes of self-employed professionals and the investment income of the 
very wealthy. This both offers the opportunity to increase fiscal space overall and to make 
taxation policy more equitable, supporting the inclusivity of economic resilience. 
 Appropriate taxation of natural resource production, utilising corporate income taxes, 
resource rent taxes and/or royalty payments. This is particularly relevant given the 
number of lower-middle income countries which depend heavily on natural resource 
exports. 
 Increased revenue collection from 'sin taxes' (e.g. on alcohol and cigarette) and 
'green taxes' (e.g. fuel duty), which both have revenue raising potential and can help to 
reduce the need for expenditure in other areas (e.g. health spending). Currently most 
LMIC countries impose much lower rates of tax on cigarettes than do advanced 
economies. 
 Measures to increase corporate taxes and VAT through business registration, 
regulatory and tax administration reforms to encourage business formalisation, 
and measures to encourage switching from cash to electronic payments. 
 Reducing tax expenditure (i.e. exemptions and incentive schemes), with a likely first 
step being publishing details of tax expenditures and/or including tax expenditure as a 
line item in the government budget 
 Improving tax administration performance and efficiency, through measures such as 
corporatisation of revenue authorities, improved use of ICT, increased use of risk-based 
audits and improved communication with tax payers. 
Management of investment flows and financial system risks 
Controls on capital inflows and outflows have been frequently used by middle-income 
countries, particularly during times of crisis and amongst countries with fixed exchange 
rates. The East Asian Crisis also led Malaysia and some other East Asian countries to adopt 
controls on capital outflows in an effort to control the crisis and increase stability in the future 
(Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002). Such controls have also been adopted in other parts of the world, for 
example controls on inflows in Chile in the 1990s. In the run up to and aftermath of the global 
financial crisis of 2008/9, capital controls were even more frequently utilised in middle-income 
countries, including Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
Since the late 1990s economists have increasingly come to accept that capital controls 
have a role to play in reducing the risks of economic shocks. In the wake of the East Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997 crisis many commentators noted that those East Asian countries that 
most closely controlled capital inflows – notably China, Taiwan, and India – were least effected 
by the crisis (Crotty, et al., 1999). Analysis by Maud et al. (2011) suggests that controls on capital 
inflows make monetary policy more independent, reduce real exchange rate pressures, and alter 
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the composition of investment inflows towards longer maturity investments (thus reducing 
volatility), whilst not affecting the overall volume of inflows. Controls on capital outflows also 
appeared to be effective in the case of Malaysia, though elsewhere they have proved very hard 
to enforce and largely ineffective (Maud et al, 2011). Indeed, in a reversal of its stance in 
previous decades, the IMF now recommends the use of controls on both capital inflows and 
outflows in certain circumstances. 
However, capital controls need to be designed carefully to be effective and to avoid 
adverse consequences. The design and implementation of these controls is a complex matter, 
and badly designed controls can exacerbate corruption and deter productive investments 
(Hartwell, 2001). Even in the case of the poster-child for capital controls - Malaysia during the 
Asian Financial Crisis – there is evidence that controls may have had negative consequences. In 
particular, they have been blamed for an intensification in a culture of "crony capitalism" that may 
have reduced economic growth and stability in the long-term (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002).  
Regardless of whether capital controls are utilised, sound macroeconomic policy can help 
reduce disruptive volatility in capital flows following shocks. There is evidence that FPI 
volatility is strongly influenced by the volatility of expectations regarding future macroeconomic 
variables such as the interest rate, inflation, exchange rate, market capitalization rate and GDP 
(Karimo and Tobi, 2013). Whilst these are clearly all influenced by exogenous factors they are 
also influenced by policies adopted by governments and central banks. As a result, it is 
reasonable to conclude that building a reputation for sound fiscal and monetary policy will reduce 
the volatility of capital flows during a crisis, supporting economic resilience. 
Sound financial sector regulation is increasingly recognised as vital to ensuring 
economic resilience in the face of economic shocks. The Basel III accords on banking 
regulations represented a key development in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis designed to 
prevent the reoccurrence of similar crises. The standards are still in the process of 
implementation, with the deadline for implementation of some enhanced rules delayed from 2022 
to 2023 in light of the need inn many countries to focus on the immediate coronavirus response 
(Bank of International Settlements, 2020). Only a few middle-income countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey) are members of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, which developed Basel III. However, there is evidence that 
countries that adopt the kinds of regulations recommended by BASEL III are less likely to suffer 
from severe financial crises in the face of economic shocks (Navajas & Thegeya, 2013). 
Crisis management 
Effective governments are better able to respond to the challenges posed by severe 
economic shocks. General government effectiveness and policy capacity is generally as 
important as the specific of crisis planning and response protocols, particularly when it comes to 
dealing with novel and multi-dimensional shocks (Woo, 2020). This is not something that can be 
built rapidly or through easy fixes. Improving government effectiveness during crises requires the 
development over time of systems for policy development and implementation and competent 
cadres of civil servants at the policy level. It also requires the existence of competent operational-
level staff with appropriate standard-operating-procedures (Baubion, 2013). 
Crisis management procedures are also important, especially systems for cross-
government coordiantion. Often crises require working across normal sectoral categories and 
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organisational units in order to develop a response that is both rapid and comprehensive. There 
is some evidence that pre-planned crisis management protocols and coordination mechanisms 
can help achieve this (Janssen and der Voort, 2020). Such systems and procedures are, 
however, generally not a substitute for strong centre-of-government institutions (e.g. Prime 
Ministers' Offices and Finance Ministries) capable of coordinating the response to a complex 
emergency across government. 
The OECD (Baubion, 2013) has identified five cross-cutting issues that affect the 
effectiveness of crisis management by governments. This includes the need for an overall 
crisis governance framework, the importance of access to scientific knowledge and expertise, the 
centrality of leadership, development of inter-agency response networks that can be mobilised 
and coordinated to achieve a cohesive response, and capacity for international cooperation. In 
addition, evidence from the 2015 MERS outbreak and the 2020 COVID pandemic has borne out 
the longstanding understanding of the importance of effective public communication during a 
crisis, including the ability to use both regular and social media in order to increase compliance 
with necessary measures (Lee & Hong, 2016; Rao, et al., 2020). 
Countries can also help prepare for future crises by moving towards a systematic 
approach to identifying future threats and conducting contingency planning for their 
eventuality. An example of this approach concerns Singapore's creation of the Centre for 
Strategic Futures in the wake of SARS. The Centre was situated at the heart of government, 
within the Prime Minister's Office, and was tasked to conduct "horizon scanning", with the 
promotion of "resilience" being one of its specific tasks (Centre for Strategic Futures, 2017). 
Ensuring an appropriate balance between the efficiency and 
robustness of systems 
Resilience is not without costs and is not compatible with a single-minded pursuit of 
efficiency in which resources are exclusively allocated to maximise immediate 
productivity or value-for-money. As Nasim Nicholas Taleb has noted, in overly-optimised 
systems, “errors compound, multiply and swell", creating dangerous cascades that might be 
avoided in a system that was less efficient but more robust. 
Wu et al. (2020) argue that the key to resilience in the face of severe shocks is to build-up 
"excess capacity" or "slack" that will normally be underutilised. This is not a prescription 
that is confined to specific domains (e.g. having more emergency beds than you need in normal 
times), since the specific capacities that will be tested by future shocks are generally hard to 
predict. Instead, it requires a recalibration of public administration priorities across the board, 
away from a narrow focus on efficiency or optimisation for routine procedures, towards an 
approach that also takes account of the need for robustness in the face of unexpected demands 
and shocks. This relates to an acceptance of built-in system inefficiencies that support upscaling 
and adaption when required. Examples of this could concern the existence of taxes set at very 
low rates, which may be inefficient in terms of the revenue collected relative to the cost of 
collection, but which offer the opportunity to rapidly increase revenue by increasing rates. This 
may be particularly relevant for borrowing-constrained middle-income countries. 
An appreciation of the potential trade-offs between efficiency and resilience needs to be 
built into future development programming in middle-income countries. One of the 
dominant paradigms that has influenced the design of development programming, the New 
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Public Management (NPM) approach (Valters and Whitty, 2017), has often led to a focus on 
increasing the efficiency of the economic and political systems of lower- and middle-income 
countries rather than their resilience. There is a strong case to be made for more development 
programmes to be designed specifically to support increased resilience in middle-income 
countries. However, a more important initial priority is probably to ensure that programming  
explicitly takes account of the possibility of trade-offs between primary programme objectives and 
economic resilience. One possibility to ensure that economic resilience concerns are built into 
the design of future programmes would be to require that programme business cases for new 
programmes consider a question such as: "what impact will this programme have on economic 
resilience." This would, to some extent, represent a natural extension of the existing requirement 
that business cases for programmes in fragile states, consider the potential impact on state 
fragility and conflict risks (DFID, 2011). 
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